Intelligence by Proxy? The Geopolitics of the India–Canada Assassination Allegations

The diplomatic crisis between India and Canada has evolved into one of the most consequential intelligence controversies confronting liberal democracies in recent years. What began with Canada’s allegation that agents linked to the Indian government were involved in the June 2023 killing of Sikh separatist Hardeep Singh Nijjar has since expanded beyond a bilateral dispute. Parallel investigations in the United States, criminal indictments, and ongoing law enforcement actions have shifted the debate toward a broader question: how do modern states conduct covert operations while maintaining plausible deniability?

The answer, if investigators’ allegations are ultimately substantiated, lies not necessarily in the direct deployment of intelligence officers but in the use of criminal intermediaries.

From Diplomatic Crisis to Intelligence Question

When Prime Minister Justin Trudeau informed Parliament in September 2023 that Canadian intelligence possessed “credible allegations” linking Indian agents to Nijjar’s killing, the statement marked an extraordinary moment in relations between two democratic partners. New Delhi rejected the accusation as “absurd” and “politically motivated,” arguing that Canada had failed to produce publicly verifiable evidence while ignoring Indian concerns over Sikh separatist activities operating from Canadian soil.

The dispute escalated rapidly. Diplomats were expelled, intelligence cooperation deteriorated, and bilateral relations reached their lowest point in decades. At the time, critics argued that Ottawa had advanced an explosive accusation without disclosing sufficient evidence to convince international observers.

Since then, however, the controversy has broadened. Investigations in both Canada and the United States have increasingly focused not only on alleged state actors but also on transnational criminal networks and their possible role in facilitating targeted violence abroad.

The Proxy Model of Covert Action

One of the most significant developments has been the emergence of allegations involving members of the Lawrence Bishnoi criminal network.

The importance of these allegations extends beyond the identity of the suspects. They touch upon a long-established principle of intelligence tradecraft: states rarely conduct politically sensitive operations through official personnel when deniability can be preserved through intermediaries.

Intelligence agencies historically have relied on proxies of various kinds, including militias, insurgent groups, organized crime syndicates, and private actors. The strategic logic is straightforward. Outsourcing violence creates distance between the sponsoring state and the operation itself, complicating attribution while reducing diplomatic costs if an operation is exposed.

Within intelligence studies, this approach is commonly understood as operating at arm’s length. Rather than issuing direct operational orders through official channels, states are alleged to cultivate relationships with actors who possess both capability and plausible independence.

Importantly, the existence of this doctrine does not establish that it was employed in any particular case. It provides a framework through which investigators and analysts evaluate patterns of behaviour when direct evidence remains classified or contested.

The Bishnoi Network and the Question of Attribution

North American investigations have reportedly examined whether individuals associated with the Lawrence Bishnoi organization were involved in attacks against Sikh activists abroad, including the killings of Hardeep Singh Nijjar, Sukhdool Singh, and Ripudaman Singh Malik.

These investigations have generated a broader analytical question.

If criminal networks carried out these attacks, were they acting independently for financial or personal motives, or were they functioning as intermediaries for a larger strategic actor?

This distinction is critical.

Criminal organizations frequently possess the operational capabilities necessary for transnational violence. They maintain clandestine logistics, access to weapons, recruitment networks, and experience evading law enforcement. These characteristics make them attractive partners for any actor seeking deniable operational capacity.

At the same time, proving coordination between criminal organizations and state institutions requires a considerably higher evidentiary threshold than demonstrating the involvement of criminals alone.

To date, Indian authorities have consistently denied directing or facilitating overseas assassinations, and no court has established state responsibility for the Nijjar killing.

Sovereignty in an Era of Deniable Operations

The controversy has also reignited debate over the meaning of sovereignty in the twenty-first century.

Former Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) officer Dan Stanton recently argued that the allegations represent “the biggest assault on Canada’s sovereignty.” His remarks reflect a broader concern within Western counterintelligence communities that foreign states may increasingly employ diplomatic infrastructure, intelligence networks, and criminal intermediaries to project coercive power beyond their borders.

Whether these allegations withstand judicial scrutiny remains an open question.

Nevertheless, the underlying concern is not unique to Canada.

Western intelligence services have repeatedly warned that foreign governments are increasingly willing to conduct influence operations, surveillance, intimidation, and, in some cases, targeted violence against dissidents living abroad. The methods vary, but the strategic objective remains consistent: extending domestic political control across international borders.

A Broader Pattern in Contemporary Intelligence

The India–Canada dispute should therefore be understood within a wider evolution of covert statecraft rather than as an isolated bilateral disagreement.

Over the past two decades, governments have increasingly been accused of relying on proxy actors to achieve strategic objectives while preserving plausible deniability. Allegations involving Russian intelligence in Europe, Iranian proxy networks across the Middle East, and other cases have all highlighted a similar trend: the outsourcing of operational risk.

This reflects structural changes in intelligence operations.

Advances in digital surveillance, forensic science, and international information sharing have made traditional covert action more difficult to conceal. As attribution technologies improve, states face greater political costs when official personnel are directly implicated.

Proxy networks offer an alternative.

Organized crime, extremist organizations, and other non-state actors provide operational flexibility while creating legal and political ambiguity. Even when investigations identify those who carried out an attack, establishing responsibility further up the chain of command remains substantially more difficult.

The Legal Threshold

From a legal perspective, however, the distinction between suspicion and proof remains fundamental.

International law imposes state responsibility only when sufficient evidence demonstrates that individuals acted under the direction, control, or effective authority of a state. Intelligence assessments, investigative findings, and political statements may contribute to that picture, but criminal and international legal standards require evidence capable of withstanding judicial scrutiny.

That distinction explains why governments often speak in terms of “credible allegations,” “reasonable grounds,” or “ongoing investigations” rather than definitive conclusions.

For policymakers, intelligence may be persuasive long before it becomes legally admissible.

For courts, the opposite is true.

Beyond India and Canada

The significance of this controversy ultimately extends beyond bilateral diplomacy.

If investigators establish that criminal organizations functioned as proxies for state-directed operations, the case would represent one of the clearest examples in recent years of the convergence between intelligence services and transnational organized crime. Such a finding would have profound implications for diplomatic immunity, counterintelligence cooperation, and international legal norms governing sovereignty.

If, however, the evidence ultimately supports the conclusion that the perpetrators acted independently without state direction, the episode will underscore the dangers of political attribution in an environment where sophisticated criminal organizations possess the capability to operate across borders.

Either outcome carries important lessons.

The central issue is no longer simply whether one assassination was state-sponsored. It is whether the architecture of modern covert action has evolved to the point where the distinction between statecraft and organized crime is becoming increasingly difficult to establish.

As investigations continue in multiple jurisdictions, that question—not only the fate of a single criminal case—may prove to be the controversy’s most enduring geopolitical legacy.